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Abstract 
Using the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation methods (GMM) for a balanced panel 
data from 1980-2010 for 14 Indian states, we try to find whether the election affects the 
individual components of transfers from the centre to the states, namely, grants from the centre, 
loan from the centre, and tax devolution. We also attempt to examine if different transfer 
variables and other politico-economic characteristics of the country are able to create the 
possibility of retaining the political power for the incumbent. We find that the right wing and 
coalition governments are less likely to transfer resources to the states. However, the state level 
ruling party, which is either the same party at the centre or an ally, tends to get higher transfers 
from the centre than a non-allied one. Similar to the pre-election political budget cycles found in 
the existing literature (Drazen and Eslava, 2010, Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2011, Klomp and Hahn, 
2013, Chortareas, Logothetis and Papandreou, 2016), the political transfer cycle (PTC) is visible 
one year before the election in the case of grants from the centre and loan from the centre but not 
in the case of tax devolution. The paper is also extended to a binary Logit specification to test for 
the incumbent‟s probability of winning the election. We find that grants and loans are likely to 
have varied impacts on an election win depending on the timing. Opportunistic grants in the year 
before the election are likely to help win the election whereas a loan punishes the incumbent. 
Instead, opportunistic manipulations in grants and loan in the year of election help the incumbent 
retain political power. Further, it is found that a higher voters‟ turnout in the state is more likely 
to win the election, inflation reduces the possibility of the win, and a more experienced 
government has a higher probability of a win. Moreover, our results also show that the right wing 
government is more likely to win the election.  
 
JEL Classification: C72, D72, E62, H72 
 
Keywords: Opportunist Incumbent; Political Budget Cycle, Political Transfer Cycle, Indian 
Federation. 
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1. Background 
In a federal structure, the central government has the incentive, as also the capability, to 
manipulate the transfers given to the states (provinces/ sub national jurisdictions) so as to 
enhance the possibility of winning the national election. This very idea is based on the concept of 
a political budget cycle (PBC), which alleges that the incumbent can opportunistically 
manipulate the fiscal policy to increase the possibility of winning the election (see Manjhi and 
Mehra (2016) for a theoretical exposition of this issue). In the similar vein, one can posit the 
centre-state political transfer cycle (PTC) and pose the question -- can the national level 
incumbent government strategically transfer the resources to states? Also, whether by 
transferring the resources she/ he can increase the chances of winning the election and form the 
government? For instance opportunistic behavior help the incumbent to win the election in 
Columbian municipality (Drazen and Eslava, 2010) and spending more opportunistically close to 
election helps to win the election in the Portuguese municipality (Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2011) 
and Chortareas, Logothetis and Papandreou (2016) also confirm that opportunistic expenditure 
by the incumbent is electorally rewarded.  
Most of the literatures on the political business cycle focus on the opportunism and partisan 
behavior of the government. The political business cycle within a partisan framework refers to 
the case when different political parties have a clear preference for specific macroeconomic 
objectives, and the fluctuations in the macro economic variables are a consequence of politicians 
having different policy objectives. In comparison, an opportunist politician does not have any 
policy objective, except the desire to win the elections. Since the advent of the seminal paper by 
Nordhaus (1975), the literature on political business cycles has been significantly enriched. He 
considered an opportunistic pre-electoral manipulation of economic policies (that is, generation 
of inflation-unemployment cycles) by the incumbent to raise the chances of getting re-elected, 
whereas, Hibbs (1977) explained the post-electoral cycles due to varied macroeconomic goals of 
the policy makers, popularly known as partisan cycles. Hibbs finds that the nations having low 
unemployment and high inflation configuration are regulated and led by the left-oriented 
government, whereas those with high unemployment and low inflation are typically governed by 
centre and right wing parties. These works (Nordhaus, 1975 and Hibbs, 1977) constitute the first 
generation models of political business cycle that utilize an exploitable inflation-unemployment 
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trade-off and adaptive expectation hypothesis. In fact, most of the political business cycle 
literature analyzes the situation of an incumbent being either an opportunist or a partisan under 
two alternative situations of - adaptive and rational - expectation of citizen voters. The concept of 
PBC in a partisan framework states that different political parties have a clear preference for 
specific policies and the fluctuations in the associated economic variables are a consequence of 
politicians pursuing different goals. In comparison, an opportunist politician does not pursue any 
specific policy objective but instead has the desire to win the elections. It is also quite possible 
that an incumbent can act as an opportunist prior to election and behave in a partisan manner 
after winning the election (Frey and Schneider, 1978). 
The second generation models led by Cukierman-Meltzer (1986), Rogoff & Sibert (1988), 
Rogoff (1990), Persson & Tabellini (1990) use the rational expectations concept and opportunist 
cycles, whereas Alesina (1987) analyzes partisan cycles. Cukierman-Meltzer (1986) state that, 
under asymmetry of information, the discretionary policy of the government increases the re-
election prospects but with an imposed social cost. The social cost can be eliminated if both, the 
government and voters, have same set of information. From Nordhaus (1975), the brief forty 
years‟ history of political business cycle moved on to PBC propounded by Rogoff (1990) and 
further extended by Drazen (2000), where the latter two works cover the fiscal/ budget 
components in detail and not just the inflation-unemployment trade-off cycle based on the 
Phillips curve. The most recent strand of research incorporates the possibility of signaling and 
competency in a model of PBC, which can be attributed to Rogoff (1990), Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) (henceforth AVV). 
Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) show how the budget cycle can occur in the 
presence of rational voters, where voters are less informed about the complexities of the 
government  budget. So, the government can signal its competency by focusing more on the 
expenditure on visible public good (consumption good) and assign lower priority to investment 
expenditure, and thus increase the chances of winning the election. The remaining papers obtain 
similar results, although Persson and Tabellini (1990) add the concept of competency in their 
analysis. AVV also analyze competency and find that the incumbent signals this by spending 
more on visible public goods a year before the election to gain voting support. AVV also derive 
that a lower victory margin in the last election makes the incumbent more opportunist in the 
current period. In addition, Shi and Svensson (2002a) postulate the PBC phenomenon as a moral 
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hazard problem where the incumbent takes the advantage of asymmetry of information by 
signaling the competency before the election through fiscal policy of producing public goods 
without raising taxes.  
In a full information dynamic optimization framework, Manjhi and Mehra (2016) suggest that 
incumbent gets higher voting support in case of both -- opportunist and partisan -- behavior, but 
reject the same when there is strong anti-incumbency in the former. Also, the cycles are more 
pronounced in the case of the opportunist than a partisan incumbent. Hence, opportunism is good 
for the incumbent to win the election but costly for the economy as a whole. There also exists 
empirical literature on the subject. 
Shi and Svensson (2002b) use a panel of 123 countries for a period of 1975-1995 and find some 
evidence of PBC among developing countries whereas Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) find 
the evidence of these cycles in aggregate fiscal variables but no evidence of cycles in any single 
budget component for a sample of 13 OECD countries over the period 1960-1993. In a sample of 
60 democracies over the period of 1960-1980, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a revenue cycle, 
but no political cycle of spending or transfers. They also find that, while all democratic systems 
display cycles before the elections, only presidential systems show evidence of fiscal 
adjustments after elections. Brender and Drazen (2005) find PBC only in new democracies. 
Drazen and Eslava (2010), show that the incumbent can influence the voters by changing the 
composition of government spending, rather than the overall spending or revenues. In fact, 
rational voters can also support the opportunistic spending by the incumbent government.  
Efthyvoulou (2012) finds a stronger evidence of PBC among the European Union as compared to 
those who are not yet a part of the Union over the period 1997-2008.  
Since, the focus of our analysis is on the centre-state transfer of funds, a discussion on some 
studies in this regard is in order.  Kroth (2012) uses a panel dataset of 9 provinces of Africa over 
the period 1995-2010, and derives two important results. First, provinces where the national 
ruling party faces higher electoral competition receive higher per capita transfers in the year 
before the election. Second, this increase is driven by a conditional grant, which is the non-
formula-based component of the total inter-governmental transfer. Khemani (2004) shows that 
electoral budget cycle affect the composition of local budgets. That is, Indian state governments 
do not manipulate aggregate fiscal variables such as total spending or deficits in the run-up to an 
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election, but instead manipulate the individual budget items and investment on public projects. 
The evidence of local budget cycle can also be found in Reid (1998) and Kneebone and 
McKenzie (2001) for the Canadian provinces. Drazen and Eslava (2010) bring a descriptive 
evidence of significant increase in investment prior to elections in local governments in 
Colombia, an increase which is only partially compensated by a decrease in government 
consumption, whereas Brender and Drazen (2013) find a large change in the composition of 
expenditure in the established democracies during the election. Alesina and Paradisi (2014) find 
a strong PBC, particularly for South of Italy using a „lower tax‟ regime close to the election 
whereas Baskaran, Brender, Blesse and Reingewertz (2016) find that a low share of revenue 
raised by Israeli local municipalities budget creates excessive dependence on central government 
transfers, and hence the PBC; however, tightening of the monitoring eliminates it. Sengupta 
(2011) demonstrates that federal welfare may actually increase with the politically motivated 
transfers, and the state ruled by the same government as the centre receives higher grants and 
hence more public good. Sengupta (2015) finds that if the central government grant is tied up 
with a public project of the province, provincial tax and central transfers tend to be strategic 
substitutes: higher central transfer lowers the marginal utility of public project to the province 
and the province responds by cutting down taxes. Thus, if the central welfare is increasing in 
provincial taxes, centre should choose a mode of transfer which generates high provincial taxes. 
Chortareas, Logothetis and Papandreou (2016) (CLP henceforth) find an opportunistic PBC 
pattern in the budget balance, in total and investment expenditure and in borrowing revenues 
irrespective of whether the mayor runs for the reelection or whether the incumbents are 
politically aligned with the central government or not. Also, the opportunistically increased 
expenditure by the incumbent is electorally rewarded.   
The focus of the current analysis is on centre-state political transfer cycles, a concept similar to 
that of PBC. The derived results state that, in fact, transfer cycles are pronounced more in case of 
grants from the centre and loan from the centre. Also, opportunistic transfers of this kind help in 
winning the elections as well both at the union and state level. Apart from these transfers the 
variables which help winning elections are-gross state domestic product, voters‟ turnout, 
experience of the party, right wing parties, same government ruling the union and the states. On 
the other hand high inflation, coalition government can reduce the winning chances for the union 
as well as the state government.   
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2. Structure of the Fiscal Federalism and Possible Politics 
With the onset of economic liberalization in a number of countries in the post 1980s many of 
them, namely, China, Brazil, Argentina and Russia have moved towards a federal structure of 
centripetal kind, whereas some big federations, such as Canada, United States and Australia have 
been structured more as the centrifugal type. India has moved from a centralized quasi-federation 
to a co-operative and competitive structure of the centre-state power relationship and it seems to 
have commonality with the former group. For India, the first three decades after independence, 
till the late 1980s, can be termed as the phase of centralized federation. The subsequent post 
reform era can be broadly termed as that of cooperative-cum-competitive federation. This 
phenomenon is also supported by the idea of a coalitional structure of the government, which 
came into existence effectively in the early 1990s. That is, the state government that happened to 
be an ally of the central government would mostly co-operate whereas the non-allied ones would 
compete.  
The structure of the Indian federalism comprises three tiers – national (centre), sub-national 
(state) and sub-sub-national (panchayat/ municipality/district councils). On several occasions, 
states have sought for higher autonomy, but the centre has always maintained its supremacy in 
decisions making. In fact, in some cases, centre has even amended the constitution to move items 
from the state list to the concurrent list, and thus increase its own share of spending (George and 
Gulati, 1985a). There is a clearly demarcated line of revenue generation under national and sub-
national level.  
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the revenue receipt by the states (in other words transfers 
from the union government). The total revenue receipts consist of total tax revenue and total non 
tax revenue. The total tax revenue is further segregated into states own tax revenue and shared 
taxes (tax devolution is decided by the Finance Commission (FC)). Similarly, total non tax 
revenue consists of states own non tax revenue and grants from the union government. The tax 
devolution consists of – (i) shared income taxes, (ii) shared estate duty, and (iii) share of union 
excise duties. The grants from the centre have four components, namely – (i) non plan grants, (ii) 
grants for the state plan schemes, (iii) grants for central plan schemes, and (iv) grants for 
centrally sponsored schemes.  The tax devolution and grants from the centre constitute the total 
finance commission transfers. The FC is an independent body, appointed by the president of 
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India every five years. So, far 14 FC reports have been tabled, and almost all have been accepted 
by the central government. Effectively, there are three ways centre can transfer the resources 
from centre, namely- 
(i) Statutory Transfers=Shared Taxes + Non Plan Grants 
(ii) Grants for State Plan Schemes 
(iii) Discretionary Transfers=Grants for Central Plan Schemes + Grants for Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes.  
 
Figure 1: Flow Chart of the States Revenue Receipts 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
Consequently, there are also three institutions, which control the transfers from the centre to 
states. Firstly, FC decides on the level of the tax devolution and non plan grants and, since FC is 
an independent body, the direct political influence is the least possible scenario here. Secondly, 
Planning Commission (now NITI (National Institution for Transforming India) Aayog) 
recommends grants and loans for implementing development schemes. Finally, grants provided 
by the different ministries to the specific projects wholly funded by the centre (central plan 
schemes) or the cost of the development schemes are shared by states (centrally sponsored 
Revenue Receipts 
Total Tax Revenue Total Non Tax Revenue 
Own Tax Revenue Shared Taxes (Tax 
Devolutions 
Own Non Tax 
Revenue 
Grants from 
Central Govt. 
(i) Shared Income Taxes+(ii) Shared Estate 
Duty+(iii) Share of Union Excise Duties ((a) 
Basic Union Excise Duties + (b) Additional 
Excise Duties) 
(i) Non Plan Grants+ (ii) Grants for State 
Plan Schemes+(iii) Grants for Central Plan 
Schemes+(iv) Grants for Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes 
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schemes). The grants for state plan schemes require centre‟s approval of the projects proposed by 
states; hence, there is a possibility of some discretion (Rao and Singh, 2001). In general, the 
possibility of political influence cannot be ruled out in case of grants from the centre and loan 
from the centre but this may not directly manipulate in tax devolution. 
One of the bases for the transfer from centre to states is the revenue expenditure imbalance at the 
state level. That is, states might go on spending without any constraint (or without thinking much 
about the fiscal deficit), because that would in any case be compensated by the union through 
transfers. In conclusion, this mechanism can create a moral hazard problem and lack of discipline 
among the states. It is in this respect that FCs have been criticized for the use of grants to fill the 
revenue-expenditure gaps claimed by the states (Rao and Singh, 2007). The finance commission 
transfers and tax devolution are mostly under the purview of FC. However, there is already a 
greater role to be played by the Planning Commission and central government for the transfers 
such as- grants from the centre and loan from the centre. Overall; it seems that central 
government tries to maintain political control over the transfers in some way. Also, there are 
evidences of the attempts of the influence on the antecedent and consequences of the whole 
transfer process. Rao and Singh (2007) and Rudolph and Rudolph (2001) state that even while 
the FC uses the different formulaic based decision on transfers or grants, it has been observed 
that the states which are represented as the member of the commission do relatively better in 
terms of the received awards.  
In fact, there exists a large amount of literature covering the political aspect of the transfers in 
India, namely Rao and Singh (1998), Biswas and Marjit (2000), Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta 
(2003) (henceforth DDD), (Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dillon and Dutta, 2009) (henceforth 
ADDD) and Rao and Singh (2007). Rao and Singh (1998) demonstrate that implicit transfers in 
India disproportionately benefit the richer states whereas Biswas and Marjit (2000) show that 
states‟ representation in the cabinet of the central government affects the state wise distribution 
of Letters of Intent and Industrial Licenses. The paper by DDD and ADDD construct a 
redistributive model of politics where the central government is an opportunist and uses its 
discretion to disproportionately grant the aligned states, whereas Rao and Singh (2007) analyze 
the institutional process through which reform takes place and the influence of the politics on 
institutions such as Finance Commission. The structure of federalism might be different across 
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countries of the world. There are studies that cover the political influence, for instance, Inman 
and Rubinfeld (1997), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996, 1998a, 1998b) and Lindbeck and 
Weibull (1987).  Inman and Rubinfeld show how representation and assignment affect the 
political values of participation, protection of individual rights, development of civic virtues, 
allocation of goods and services and, hence, economic efficiency. Dixit and Londregan (1995, 
1996, 1998a, 1998b) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) construct a theoretical model of tactical 
redistribution which describes how a political party will design its policy platform in order to 
target the electoral goals. The former study aims to maximize the vote share and the latter targets 
on winning the election.  
One of the prime motivations underlying this research is the observed announcement of transfer 
packages and actual transfers operated by the centre to the states prior to and after the elections 
in the Indian federal structure. The variables we use here are grants from the centre (Gfc), loan 
from the centre (Lfc) and tax devolution (Td).
4
 Figure 2 shows the transfers defined in terms of 
the level of opportunism for different years (namely, all years, year of election, year before 
election, year and year before election, year after election, non-election years) in the electoral 
period. In general, deviations with respect to Gfc, Lfc and Td hover around zero for all years and 
states. Notice that, Gfc in most cases deviates negatively in the election years, whereas Td 
deviates negatively in the year of and year before the election in almost all cases. However, Gfc 
deviates positively in the year before the election, more so if the state ruling party is same as the 
union government or the allied party. The deviations of Gfc and Td are all positive after the 
election. In most cases Lfc is positively deviated in the year of election or a year before. It 
appears that the opportunistic manipulations are higher in the case of Lfc. The opportunistic 
deviations have also been shown in the specific context where the state-level ruling party is an 
ally of the union government as well as when it is not. Some interesting points to note are -- on 
the aggregate, the allied state ruling party gets higher Gfc and Lfc in general and year before the 
election in particular. In fact, a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is 
estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is non-aligned and non-swing 
(ADDD). 
                                                          
4
 The detail definition and the mechanism of transfers are provided in Appendix A 
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In addition, so far, a bulk of research has focused on the advanced economies and not on 
developing or emerging countries, particularly at the sub-national level, which is an obvious 
lacuna. More specifically, the analysis of PBC has been largely attempted for advanced 
countries, and more so with focus on various fiscal heads of financing the expenditure and 
collecting revenue through taxes. However, hardly any work pertains to the centre-state (federal) 
transfers, especially for developing economies like India. In this respect, this study fills an 
important gap in the literature.  
The study analyzes the union government‟s politically motivated transfer behaviour towards its 
provinces with the aim to win the election. It is especially interesting to analyze the effect of 
transfers on election outcomes in a country where caste and religion based politics and political 
alignment are frequently used for political gains (Yadav, 1999). In some cases, if riots occur in 
the year preceding the assembly elections, the vote share of right wing party in India goes up by 
5 to 7 percent (Iyer and Shrivastava, 2015). However, in the current research, factors such as 
religion, caste and riot are not modeled. Instead, the focus is on transfer variables, with others, 
namely, gross state domestic product, inflation, parties‟ year of experience as an incumbent etc. 
used as controls. Figure 2 provides an indication of the presence of opportunistic behavior of the 
ruling party, particularly for the allied parties at the state level. The economic opportunism has 
been defined as – Opportunism = (Election year or year before election value-Average of the remaining 
years in an electoral period)
5
. For our purpose, year before election manipulation has been considered as 
the opportunistic behavior of the incumbent. It can be seen that the opportunistic transfers are more 
pronounced for the same ruling party in both the union and state governments or allied parties 
than for the non-allied ones in the year of election and one year before the election.  
In general, fiscal variables in a federal context are expected to follow an expansionary trend 
before the election. In fact, Figure 2 shows the similar structure of cycles in case of Gfc and Lfc; 
however, it is not so with Td. In fact, Td mostly displays a negative deviation before and during 
the election than otherwise. The analysis is also extended to look at whether the expansion of 
                                                          
5
 One way to calculate the opportunism is deviation of economic values from the trend (HP filter values) during the 
election. Here we have calculated the deviation from trend as, the reference year value minus average of the 
remaining years in an electoral period. If, reference year equal to year of election or year before the election then is a 
measurement of opportunism of the incumbent. 
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transfers in the year prior to the election is higher or lower if the party in the state is in alliance 
with the union government or not?  
Figure 2: Opportunistic transfers in the electoral period for general election 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy  
This paper attempts to analyze whether, in the federal structure, transfers under various heads to 
the states (for example-Gfc, Lfc and Td) have been operated opportunistically by the union 
government or not? That is, whether there is expansion in the transfer from the centre to the 
states prior to the election or not? Also, whether the opportunistically created transfer cycles 
impacts the electoral outcome at the union and the states? To trace these questions we proceed to 
look at whether there are effects of election years on these transfers? Followed by whether these 
opportunistic behaviors of the incumbent confirm their re-election? The remaining sections of 
this paper are as follows. Section 2 covers a brief description of the Indian federal structure. The 
data and methods as well as the tracing of PTC are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses 
the key results. Finally, Section 5 concludes as well as prescribes policy recommendations. 
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3. Tracing the Political Transfer Cycle 
3.1 Data and Methods 
We utilize a balanced panel of 14 Indian states
6
, excluding the newly created states such as 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Telangana as well as some additional states where 
regular elections did not take place, namely, Goa and Jammu and Kashmir. Also, all North-East 
states have been dropped from the sample as these are special category states. By virtue of being 
„special category‟ states they receive very generous financial treatment from the union 
government (Rao and Singh, 2001; ADDD) and would not reveal the correct picture in terms of 
electoral politics. The PTC model testing, utilizes the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data 
estimation method where the sample data ranges from 1980 to 2010. This is a variant of the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for which the justification is discussed later in the 
section. The election data have been taken from the Election Commission of India
7
 and from 
myneta.info
8
. The fiscal variables, such as Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) and Net State 
Domestic Product (NSDP) are extracted from Central Statistical Organization (CSO) database 
for India. Inflation has been calculated as the percentage change of NSDP deflator for the states 
and RBI website has been used to get the WPI data for the national level inflation. The predicted 
population for non-census years has been collected from CSO, and the geographical area of the 
states has been taken from the Census, 1991. Grants from the Center, Loan from the Center and 
Tax Devolution have been collected from Reserve Bank of India (Handbook of Statistics on 
State Government Finances)
9
 and the Ministry of Finance, Government of India
10
.  
The interesting question to be posed here is whether and how centre-state fiscal transfers affect 
the national level election outcomes approximated using state wise results of the general 
election? That is, will the national level election (general election) be influenced by transfers 
operated from the centre to the states on account of wooing the voters one year prior to the 
                                                          
6
 States included in the empirical estimation are - Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu , Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.  
7
 http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx  
8
 http://myneta.info/ 
9
 State Finances: A Study of Budgets, 
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=State%20Finances%20:%20A%20Study%20of%20B
udgets  
10
 http://finmin.nic.in/reports/ipfstat.asp 
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election? We attempt to find answer to the same question for the assembly elections as well. The 
focus of the paper is on the transfers of resources from centre to the states through various 
means, such as - Gfc, Lfc and Td. More generally, political cycles are possible on Gfc and Lfc as 
union government has some discretion on these components and not on Td. The key question for 
which an answer is sought is whether these fiscal variables are electorally motivated?  The same 
exercise has been repeated even for the state level assembly elections. 
3.2 Estimation Method 
Based on the method by Klomp and Haan (2013), we first analyze whether fiscal decisions by 
the incumbent are affected by the election year or the year before the election. That is, whether 
there exists a PTC? If yes, what is the time pattern that it follows? Following Klomp and Haan 
(2013), the structure of the equation is postulated to be:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡     =     𝜋𝑗𝑇𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                        (1) 
where, 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  refers to the j
th
 fiscal component for i
th
 state at time t, where the fiscal variable 𝑇𝑅 
could be any of the following variables – Gfc, Lfc, and Td. The variables 𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡−𝑗 ), where j=1, 2 
are the lagged dependent variables, which are expected to affect the dependent variable auto-
regressively; so we expect 𝜋1 > 0, 𝜋2 > 0. „Elect‟ is the vector of electoral variables which 
consists of two dummy variables such as year before the election (𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡) and year of the 
election (𝑌𝑟_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡). The variable defined in binary form as, 𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1 if it‟s a year before 
the election and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝑌𝑟_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1, if it is a year of  the election and 0 
otherwise. The corresponding expected sign for both – the coefficients of 𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 and 
𝑌𝑟_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 is positive. This would imply that the year prior to election is expected to have higher 
transfers to the states so that state level (both the general and assembly) election results could be 
influenced opportunistically. A similar postulation is done for 𝑌𝑟_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡.  
The variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the vector of two variables: density of population (Density) and number of 
years party was in power (Nypp), that is, years of experience of administering the state. The 
corresponding expected signs are positive for both, because more densely populated states 
require more transfers on account for a higher need for public investment (ADDD) and more 
experienced the party is in power higher is the corresponding transfers. Next, 𝑍𝑖𝑡  is the vector of 
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binary variables that represents the following group of variables -- political ideology (for general 
elections, Pi_dum=1 if the ruling party is of right wing ideology and 0 otherwise; in case of 
assembly elections, political ideology has been ranked from 1 to 5 where 1 represents the 
extreme right and 5 the extreme left party ideology)
 11
, state ruling party is the same as the party 
in the union government or the state ruling party is an ally of it (Allied=1, if party at the state and 
union are same or allied and 0 otherwise), coalition binary (Cl_dum=1, if the union is a coalition 
government, and is 0 otherwise) and coalition in the union and state ruling party being an ally 
(Clal_dum=1, if the union is the coalition government and state ruling party is an ally, 0 
otherwise). Veiga and Veiga (2007) and AVV find that right wing Portuguese mayors are less 
opportunist than the left wing parties. Similar results have been found by Mourao and Veiga 
(2010) for a panel of 68 countries for 40 years. While Brug, Eijk and Franklin (2007) argued 
that, being more opportunist a left wing government aims more at reducing unemployment, 
while a right wing government, being less opportunist, worries more about inflation. In our case, 
we do not start with a prior for Pi_dum. If the center and state are ruled by the same party or 
ruled by the allied (Allied), states can garner more resources from the centre and, hence, the 
expected sign for the coefficient of Allied  is positive (ADDD). For the coalition governments at 
the centre, Table 1 shows that out of 434 data points, only 23% states report that the state ruling 
parties are the coalition partner of the union, and these allied states are on average getting more 
transfers than the non-allied ones. Hence, Cl_dum is expected to have the negative sign but 
Clal_dum (coalition partner) is expected to have positive sign. The state level fixed effect (FE) 
has been denoted as „𝜎𝑖‟ and 𝜗𝑖𝑡  is the random variable such that 𝐸(𝜗𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
Eq. (1) is the dynamic panel data specification model, where lagged dependent variable has been 
included along with the state level FE. In this case, OLS with FE estimates are biased and 
inconsistent unless the time dimension T is large (see Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995). The degree of 
FE biasedness is measured by  
1
𝑇
 , where T is the panel time length. As T gets larger, FE becomes 
consistent; however T does not seem to be very large in our case, so the presence of Nickel bias 
cannot be denied. In our analysis, the number of length of years is 31 for 14 cross sectional states 
                                                          
11
 In this analysis, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) or national democratic alliance (NDA) has been considered as the 
right wing party as this party is pro economic liberalism which is noted as the binary „1‟ and „0‟to rest of the parties. 
Since at the union level the Indian National Congress (INC) has ruled for most of the time and also pro economic 
liberalism but also follow many other ideologies such as – populism, social democracy etc. In total, INC can be 
termed as the centrist party. In case of assembly election political ideology has been ranked from 1 (right) to 5 (left).  
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and the use of the FE estimates in the context of a dynamic panel model may result in biased 
outcomes. Thus, to eliminate this problem, we impose Blundell and Bond (1998) two step GMM 
estimator for dynamic panel data (also see, Veiga and Veiga, 2007a, Efthyvoulou, 2012 and 
CLP).  This model built on Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimation with two 
step system GMM estimation utilizing lag differences of the dependent variables as instruments 
in the right hand side, in addition to the lag levels of the dependent variables (see Arellano and 
Bover, 1995, Baltagi, 2008). Also, since the standard errors of the two step GMM estimates tend 
to be negatively biased, we eliminate the bias by using Windmeijer (2005) finite sample 
correction and two-step robust GMM (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009a). To avoid errors in 
the results caused by instrument proliferation, we collapse the instrument set as suggested by 
Roodman (2009b) to reduce the number of moment conditions. Finally, we use the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) tests for first- and second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals and 
the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions.
12
      
In accordance with Eq. (1), two equations that have been estimated to capture the transfer cycles 
are as follows- 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡     =     𝜋𝑗𝑇𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                                            (2) 
and 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡     =     𝜋𝑗𝑇𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                        (3) 
Notably, PTC has been captured by the difference between the estimated error term of eq. (1) 
without the election dummy variables (pertaining to both – year before and year of the election) 
and the error term of eq. (2) when the election variables are included in it. These equations have 
been estimated for both the general election for the union as well as the assembly elections. The 
pattern of state-wise transfer cycles is shown in the diagrams included in Appendix A.  There is 
evidence of transfer cycles in Gfc and Lfc in the year before the election. 
3.3 Baseline Result 
                                                          
12
 We do not use the Sargan test for the Null of over-identifying restrictions because Arellano and Bond (1991) show 
that this has the tendency of over rejecting the null of over identifying restrictions are valid in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.    
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Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics for all the transfer variables defined in level as 
well as in deviation form.
13
 The section also presents the basic statistics for the additional 
variables, namely, Inflation (Infs), population density (Density), political ideology (Pi_Dum), 
state ruling party is same as union or the allied of it (Allied), coalition binary (Cl_Dum) and 
coalition in the union and state ruling party being an ally (Clal_dum). In the post-1980 period, 
India has mostly had a coalition government, frequently ruled by a left-of-the-centre government. 
Statistically, in general two variables -- Gfc and Td—display a positive deviation from the 
average, but this is not the case for Lfc. However, Gfc and Lfc have positive opportunistic 
deviation year before to the general election, whereas only former is positive in the assembly 
elections. Observably, the right wing government tends to provide less transfer but more 
opportunistic transfers in Lfc and not in Gfc and Td. If the state ruling government is same as the 
union or is an ally of it, Gfc and Lfc are higher than the otherwise. Also, coalition governments in 
the union generally transfer less. India has experienced around 7% inflation on an average during 
the analysis period (1980-2010), whereas in some cases, it goes up to as high as 53% at the state 
level and as low as a level of deflation of -3.31%. An interesting point to note is that during the 
right wing government regime, the level of inflation is generally low -- hovering around 4.35%. 
Period of low inflation for the right wing regime is also confirmed by Hibbs (1977).      
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables/ 
Statistics 
General Election Assembly Elections 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Gfc 9.795 2.818 27.372 9.795 2.818 27.372 
Lfc 10.077 0.009 39.085 10.077 0.009 39.085 
Td 16.138 3.707 53.102 16.138 3.707 53.102 
Gfc_d 0.050 -8.716 8.502 0.084 -7.244 9.946 
Lfc_d -0.126 -22.570 20.017 -0.037 -14.508 20.299 
Td_d 0.086 -12.102 11.164 0.012 -13.545 9.362 
Gfc_d* 0.073 -7.116 8.502 0.135 -7.244 5.734 
Lfc_d* 0.939 -15.526 20.017 -0.253 -14.508 15.274 
Td_d* -0.228 -7.776 8.595 -0.188 -13.545 6.081 
Gsdp 104718.1 3386.41 1100000 104718.1 3386.41 1100000 
Infs 7.413 -3.32 53.06 7.413 -3.32 53.06 
Inf if Pidum=1 4.350 -2.717 11.393 5.967 -2.717 18.861 
                                                          
13
 This is the opportunistic deviation as defined earlier. 
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Density 423.978 100.11 1023.64 423.978 100.11 1023.64 
Allied 0.410 0.000 1.000 0.410 0.000 1.000 
Cl_Dum 0.709 0.000 1.000 0.405 0.000 1.000 
Clal_dum 0.230 0.000 1.000 - - - 
Pi_Dum 0.193 0.000 1.000 0.405 0.000 1.000 
Gfc if Pidum=1 7.321 2.818 16.957 9.124 2.817 27.371 
Lfc if Pidum=1 7.941 1.758 31.499 11.142 0.063 39.084 
Td if Pidum=1 14.335 3.708 41.482 17.083 3.707 35.543 
Gfc_d* if Pidum=1 -1.233 -7.116 3.047 -0.140 -7.244 8.431 
Lfc_d* if Pidum=1 2.439 -2.899 14.955 -0.343 -14.507 20.299 
Td_d* if Pidum=1 -1.193 -6.536 3.506 0.020 -10.984 9.362 
Gfc if Allied=1 9.874 2.951 27.372 9.874 2.951 27.372 
Lfc if Allied=1 10.748 0.112 29.349 10.748 0.112 29.349 
Td if Allied=1 14.494 3.707 29.476 14.494 3.707 29.476 
Gfc if Cldum=1 9.574 2.818 23.210 9.770 2.817 27.371 
Lfc if Cldum=1 8.038 0.009 35.029 8.562 0.008 39.084 
Td if Cldum=1 16.317 3.708 53.102 16.524 3.707 53.102 
Note - all variables with „*‟ is in an opportunistic form based on year before election.  
The results of the estimation for general election are shown in Table 2 and that of the assembly 
election in Table 3. Since transfer variables are expected to follow an auto-regressive process, 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable was inevitable along with some more explanatory 
binary variables. As mentioned earlier, we have used the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data 
estimation method namely, a two step system GMM. In our estimation, the dependent variable 
refers to different variants (components) of the fiscal transfers to the states by central 
government, namely, Gfc, Lfc and Td, as also discussed earlier. Notice that the first lag of the 
dependent variable is highly significant in all the cases, although, the second lag of it is not 
statistically significant, except in case of the result in column 2 of Table 2. However, we still 
include it in the estimation as it is considered to be an important variable. Intuitively, this means 
that higher the last period transfer, larger is the successive year respective transfers. Next, there 
is the vector 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡  that consists of dummies for the years prior to and the year of the election. 
An opportunist incumbent is expected to expand the transfer before the election and induce a 
downturn in it in the post election period. The opportunistic manipulations are possible more in 
the case of Gfc and Lfc as there is greater scope for the role of the Planning Commission (now 
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NITI Aayog) and union ministries. This is evident from the fact that the year before the election 
in case of Gfc and Lfc shows significant results (also supported by Klomp and Hahn, 2013, CLP 
and AVV), whereas Td is decided by the FC, which is an independent body, and hence political 
opportunism is less pronounced in this case. In fact, Td is lower in the year before the elections. 
However, all three components show less transfers in the year of election. Interestingly, since 
loan entails a liability to be repaid back to the centre, so the central government seems to woo the 
state government as well as the voters prior to the election, providing more loans to the state and, 
thus, also transferring the burden. However, both Gfc and Lfc show evidence of opportunistic 
transfers before the election hence, clear political transfer PTC could be traced. 
The results are similar for assembly elections as well (Table 3). The first lagged of the dependent 
variable is positive and significant, whereas the second lag is not. Individually, opportunistic 
grants (Gfc) can be traced, whereas coefficients are not significant in case of both Lfc and Td.  
3.4 Political Ideology, Experience and Form of the Government  
This section analyzes the behavior of the three transfers – Gfc, Lfc and Td -- with respect to the 
following variables – population density (Density), political ideology (Pidum) and its interactions 
with the year before the election and also the year of election, state is ruled by same political 
party or allied (Allied) and coalition government at the centre (Cldum). The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  consists 
of population density (Density) and number of year party has been in power (Nypp). As 
expected, the coefficient of Density is positive in case of Gfc and Td but negative for Lfc. In fact, 
population density is one of the criteria for higher grants and devolution to the higher density 
states. However, high density states are getting less loans transfer may be because the formula 
based grants and devolution are sufficient enough to manage the fiscal policy.  Further, a more 
experienced (higher Nypp) incumbent government is expected to provide higher transfers from 
the centre and this is found to be true in case of all Gfc, Lfc and Td. Also, higher is the 
experience of the party in ruling the country, greater is the decentralization (thus more Td). 
However, Nypp for Gfc and Td specifications are not significant in some of our cases. It also 
appears that the more experienced government interested in giving loan transfers than otherwise 
as it gets repaid back.  Results are similar in case of assembly elections as well. 
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The remaining vector of explanatory variables is 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , which consists of political ideology 
(Pidum) and its interaction with the year before the election and also the year of election, union 
and state belonging to the same party or state being ruled by the allied party (Allied),  coalition 
government (Cldum) at the union, and coalition government at the union and state ruling party 
being an ally (Clal_dum). The Clal_dum has been dropped from the regression results because of 
the multi-collinearity problem. The right wing (Pidum) government exhibits the tendency to 
transfer less to the states in terms of Gfc and Td whereas more in terms of Lfc. The right wing 
government (Pidum), is significant only in case of Lfc. The right wing government has a 
tendency to encourage the states to push for self-sufficiency in revenue generation may be from 
market; this is corroborated by the fact that the abolition of loan from centre to states was one of 
the steps taken by the right wing government in India at the time the Twelfth Finance 
Commission submitted its report in 2004, which was well accepted by the union government. 
The right wing government provide less Gfc in the year before the election but more in the year 
of election. However, the opposite happens in the case of Lfc and Td. In case of assembly 
election years, Gfc is positive in the year before the election and in the year of election, but less 
Lfc has been traced. The transfers in terms of Lfc and Td are not found to be significant. 
Next, the states run by the same party as the centre or the allied (Allied) states tend to get more 
grants but less loans. This is confirmed from the results in DDD and ADDD as well.  The 
coalition government operates higher transfers in terms of Gfc and Td but lower loans to the 
states. If the same government exist even at the state level then, routes of to get higher Gfc and 
Td seems trivial. However, if the state ruling party is a coalition partner of the union government, then 
allied has to be happier with the regular flow of resources for the smooth functioning of the central 
government and if the interest of these regional players is not taken care of, there is the fear of 
withdrawal of support to the government by the allied parties, which poses a political constraint.  
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Table 2: Dependent variables are Grants from the Centre, Loan from the Centre and Tax Devolution (General Elections) 
Variables 
Grants from the Centre (Gfc) Loan from the Centre (Lfc) Tax Devolution (Td) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dep.var(-1) 
0.748 
[0.171]*** 
0.490 
[0.157]*** 
0.822 
[0.393]* 
0.985 
[0.134]*** 
1.033 
[0.117]*** 
1.042 
[0.104]*** 
0.396 
[0.165]** 
0.460 
[0.157]** 
0.401 
[0.144]** 
Dep.var(-2) 
0.130 
[0.113] 
0.254 
[0.109]** 
0.077 
[0.216] 
0.024 
[0.101] 
-0.048 
[0.097] 
-0.031 
[0.081] 
0.093 
[0.170] 
0.040 
[0.159] 
0.064 
[0.153] 
Yr_bf_elect 
0.364 
[0.183]* 
0.805 
[0.139]*** 
- 
1.005 
[0.444]** 
0.288 
[0.694] 
- 
-0.805 
[0.374]** 
-0.559 
[0.376] 
- 
Yr_elect 
-0.812 
[0.302]** 
- 
-0.955 
[0.353]*** 
-0.416 
[0.774] 
- 
-0.390 
[0.474] 
-0.868 
[0.401]** 
- 
-0.259 
[0.222] 
Density 
0.003 
[0.001]** 
0.002 
[0.001]** 
0.002 
[0.002]*** 
-0.003 
[0.002]* 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.015 
[0.009]* 
0.013 
[0.008] 
0.015 
[0.007]** 
Nypp 
-0.031 
[0.034] 
0.027 
[0.011]** 
-0.001 
[0.015] 
0.079 
[0.027]** 
0.044 
[0.006]*** 
0.024 
[0.008]*** 
0.030 
[0.029] 
0.055 
[0.014]*** 
0.036 
[0.024] 
Pi_dum 
-1.931 
[1.411] - - 
2.012 
[1.174]* - - 
-1.134 
[1.384] - - 
Pi_dum*Yr_bf_elect 
- 
-1.520 
[0.398]*** - - 
3.017 
[0.821]*** - - 
0.146 
[1.107] - 
Pi_dum*Yr_elect 
- - 
0.383 
[1.487] - - 
-2.173 
[0.638]*** - - 
-1.469 
[1.124] 
Allied 
1.191 
[0.529]* 
0.914 
[0.315]** 
0.749 
[0.668]** 
-0.402 
[0.247] 
0.030 
[0.136] 
-0.322 
[0.166] 
-0.051 
[0.739] 
-0.460 
[0.638] 
-0.168 
[0.558] 
Cl_dum 
0.593 
[0.860] 
0.278 
[0.410] 
-0.168 
[0.608] 
-1.598 
[0.773]* 
-1.250 
[0.155]*** 
-0.697 
[0.304] 
1.625 
[1.970] 
0.788 
[1.847] 
1.139 
[1.813] 
AR(1) 
-2.33 
[Pr.=0.020] 
-2.13 
[Pr.=0.033] 
-1.62 
[Pr.=0.105] 
-2.59 
[Pr.=0.010] 
 -2.70                 
[Pr.=0.007] 
 -2.83 
[Pr.=0.005] 
 -1.89 
[Pr.=0.009] 
 -2.09 
[Pr.=0.037] 
 -2.00 
[Pr.=0.046] 
AR(2) 
0.882       
[Pr.=0.773] 
-0.36 
[Pr.=0.720] 
0.43 
[Pr.=0.664] 
1.48 
[Pr.=0.139] 
1.71 
[Pr.=0.088] 
1.98 
[Pr.=0.047] 
-1.09 
[Pr.=0.275] 
-1.07 
[Pr.=0.286] 
-1.23 
[Pr.=0.218] 
#Obs. 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 
F-Stat(.) 
6383.32 
[Pr.=0.00] 
397.25 
[Pr.=0.00] 
1344.87 
[Pr.=0.00] 
5817.81 
[Pr.=0.00] 
20021.53 
[Pr.=0.00] 
22787.61 
[Pr.=0.00] 
109.99 
[Pr.=0.00] 
122.76 
[Pr.=0.00] 
52.28 
[Pr.=0.00] 
Hansen Test χ2(.) 
3.80 
[Pr.=0.579] 
2.51 
[Pr.=0.776] 
5.24 
[Pr.=0.387] 
4.75 
[Pr.=0.447] 
1.50 
[Pr.=0.913] 
2.14 
[Pr.=0.829] 
10.14 
[Pr.=0.071] 
10.27 
[Pr.=0.068] 
10.01 
[Pr.=0.075] 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (standard errors in parentheses). Sargan Test- H0: over identifying restrictions are valid (p-values in the parentheses) 
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Table 3: Dependent variables are Grants from the Centre, Loan from the Centre and Tax Devolution (Assembly Elections) 
Variables 
Grants from the Centre (Gfc) Loan from the Centre (Lfc) Tax Devolution (Td) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dep.var(-1) 
0.715 
[0.209]*** 
0.646 
[0.134]*** 
0.673 
[0.217]*** 
1.016 
[0.091]*** 
1.009 
[0.077]*** 
0.986 
[0.084]*** 
0.388 
[0.204]* 
0.405 
[0.176]** 
0.409 
[0.187]** 
Dep.var(-2) 
0.177 
[0.115] 
0.188 
[0.076]** 
0.182 
[0.118] 
-0.029 
[0.066] 
-0.004 
[0.061] 
0.005 
[0.063] 
0.080 
[0.155] 
0.048 
[0.165] 
0.043 
[0.152] 
Yr_bf_elect 
-0.001 
[0.290] 
0.087 
[0.278]*** 
- 
-0.557 
[0.354] 
-0.442 
[0.418] 
- 
0.164 
[0.375] 
0.130 
[0.360] 
- 
Yr_elect 
0.062 
[0.193] 
- 
0.040 
[0.411]*** 
0.173 
[0.672] 
- 
0.461 
[0.646] 
0.263 
[0.449] 
- 
0.039 
[0.430] 
Density 
0.002 
[0.001] 
0.002 
[0.001]** 
0.002 
[0.001] 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.013 
[0.010] 
0.014 
[0.009] 
0.014 
[0.009] 
Nypp 
-0.003 
[0.019] 
0.018 
[0.009]* 
0.014 
[0.012] 
0.071 
[0.022]*** 
0.044 
[0.006]*** 
0.042 
[0.009]*** 
0.065 
[0.037]* 
0.057 
[0.019]*** 
0.063 
[0.020]*** 
Pi_dum 
-0.976 
[0.978] - - 
1.798 
[0.932]* - - 
0.044 
[1.415] - - 
Pi_dum*Yr_bf_elect 
- 
0.820 
[0.450]* - - 
-0.187 
[1.382] - - 
-0.518 
[1.092] - 
Pi_dum*Yr_elect 
- - 
0.087 
[1.237] - - 
-0.510 
[1.229] - - 
0.950 
[0.888] 
Allied 
0.871 
[0.504]* 
0.811 
[0.385]** 
0.783 
[0.382]* 
-0.249 
[0.243] 
0.037 
[0.149] 
0.070 
[0.168] 
-0.608 
[0.814] 
-0.475 
[0.743] 
-0.541 
[0.726] 
Cl_dum 
-0.068 
[0.678] 
-0.243 
[0.358] 
-0.294 
[0.462] 
-1.601 
[0.445]*** 
-0.968 
[0.139]*** 
-1.046 
[0.157]*** 
0.858 
[1.999] 
1.040 
[1.940] 
0.983 
[2.026] 
AR(1) 
-2.25 
[Pr.=0.025] 
-2.64 
[Pr.=0.008] 
-2.17 
[Pr.=0.030] 
-2.81 
[Pr.=0.005] 
 -2.79                 
[Pr.=0.005] 
 -2.72 
[Pr.=0.006] 
 -1.75 
[Pr.=0.080] 
 -1.90 
[Pr.=0.058] 
 -1.89 
[Pr.=0.059] 
AR(2) 
0.58       
[Pr.=0.559] 
-0.53 
[Pr.=0.596] 
0.45 
[Pr.=0.665] 
1.68 
[Pr.=0.093] 
1.66 
[Pr.=0.097] 
1.59 
[Pr.=0.112] 
-1.29 
[Pr.=0.195] 
-1.16 
[Pr.=0.246] 
-1.18 
[Pr.=0.239] 
#Obs. 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 
F-Stat(.) 
4032.39 
[Pr.=0.00] 
3928.87 
[Pr.=0.00] 
5169.54 
[Pr.=0.00] 
14492.82 
[Pr.=0.00] 
20664.68 
[Pr.=0.00] 
41076.54 
[Pr.=0.00] 
89.84 
[Pr.=0.00] 
36.53 
[Pr.=0.00] 
77.26 
[Pr.=0.00] 
Hansen Test χ2(.) 
3.92 
[Pr.=0.561] 
3.73 
[Pr.=0.589] 
3.86 
[Pr.=0.570] 
3.55 
[Pr.=0.616] 
1.92 
[Pr.=0.861] 
1.53 
[Pr.=0.909] 
10.91 
[Pr.=0.053] 
10.75 
[Pr.=0.057] 
10.72 
[Pr.=0.057] 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (standard errors in parentheses). Sargan Test- H0: over identifying restrictions are valid (p-values in the parentheses) 
 
23 
 
Similar to what is found in the Drazen and Eslava, 2010, Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2011, Klomp 
and Hahn, 2013 and CLP, the budgetary expansion before the election in case of Gfc and Lfc is 
visible from the estimates in Table 2. Since the loans have to be repaid back, it does not seem 
difficult for the union government to transfer higher of it to the states before the election. Even 
when Gfc is operated as per the FC‟s recommendations, interestingly, some components of Gfc 
are determined by the Planning Commission as well as the central ministries. Thus, the year 
before the election effect appears to be very strong in case of both Gfc and Lfc transfers but not 
in case of Td. In sum, we can conclude from this analysis that centre-state transfer displays the 
electoral transfer cycle in terms of Gfc and Lfc but not in Td. The Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for 
first- and second-order serial correlation of the differences in residuals confirm the auto-
regression of AR(1) and AR(2). The Hansen test has been carried out to check whether the over-
identifying restrictions are valid or not. Except Td we find very strong non-rejection of the null 
of the validity of over-identifying restriction. Finally, the F-statistics results are strongly 
supporting the models strength. 
To trace the transfer cycles graphically, we first estimated Eq.(1) without the election year 
dummies (year before and year of election) and then estimated the second equation with these 
election years included. Intuitively, the residuals in the first case will capture the effect of the 
election years, whereas in the second case, the election years are not captured by the residuals. 
Finally, the residuals of the latter equation have been correspondingly subtracted from the former 
to get the transfers cycles. The resulting graphs of the cycles have been shown in Figures a (i) to 
a(iii) for general election and Figures b (i) to b (iii) for assembly elections in Appendix A. The 
graphs display a pattern similar to what the empirical results suggest. That is, we have strong 
electoral cycles for Gfc,and Lfc but no clear cycles in case of Td in both the general and 
assembly elections. 
Once the budget cycles is traced, an immediate question that arise is, whether the opportunistic 
transfer cycles created by the incumbent at the union and state level help to win the national and 
assembly elections? That is, since pre-electoral cycles have been created in the case of Gfc and 
Lfc, the specific question is whether these pre-electoral opportunistic cycles of Gfc and Lfc can 
help the incumbent to win the election.  
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3. Effect of Transfers on Electoral Outcome  
To analyze at the re-election prospects ascribable to opportunistic manipulations of transfers by 
the central government in the general election by states, we rely on a state-level analysis. Using 
the same dataset as above, again for 14 states, covering the general as well as the assembly 
elections in India, separately spanning the period 1980 to 2010, we attempt to estimate the 
equation of the electoral outcome. We take different transfer variants as the independent 
variables along with other binary and exogenous variables. The binary variable of victory has 
been defined state-wise in the following manner: 
𝑉 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓   𝑉∗ =
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠  𝑊𝑜𝑛  𝑏𝑦  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 −𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠  𝑊𝑜𝑛  𝑏𝑦  𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦  𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠  𝑎𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
> 0,
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
                    (4) 
where, 𝑉 is the victory as binary limited dependent variable and 𝑉∗ is the majority victory at the 
state level based on both the result of the general elections and assembly elections.  
4.1. Estimation Method 
We now employ the fixed effect Logit model approach for the panel dataset for 14 states. The 
econometric equation for the fixed effect model can be specified as- 𝑉𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , with  
 Pr 𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖 = Pr[𝑉𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0] = Pr[𝜀𝑖𝑡 , > −𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑖] = 𝐹 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜃𝑖 ,           (5) 
where, F is the standard logistics distribution function, 𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the binary outcome as the 
dependent variable (victory), which takes a value of „1‟ if the incumbent party has the state level 
majority (re-elected) and zero otherwise, 𝜃𝑖  is the state level fixed effect. Using the Hausman test 
as suggested by Baltagi (2008) under the null hypothesis of homogeneity (no individual effects), 
both conditional and unconditional estimator is consistent but the conditional Logit estimators 
are inefficient, as these may not use all the available data. Under the alternative hypothesis, the 
unconditional estimator is inefficient while the conditional estimator is both consistent and 
efficient (Greene, 2002). The Hausman test results suggests that the conditional fixed effect 
model for the estimation in case of union elections, whereas a random effect model is suitable in 
case of assembly elections. This result may be because of the different years of election in the 
state assembly elections. The Logit model in its estimable framework is as follows: 
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𝑉𝑖𝑡  =  𝛤0𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛤1 𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝐿 𝑖𝑡  +  𝛤2(∆𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝐿)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛤3𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡+ 𝛤4𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡+ 𝛤5𝑃𝑜𝑙_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  (6) 
where, i = 1, 2, 3……14, indicates the index of states for jth variable (Gfc, Lfc and Td) and t 
indicate the times series in years. The equation includes state fixed effects (𝜃𝑖) and random 
variable is 𝜀𝑖𝑡  which is assumed as E(𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,)=0. Our prime objective is to estimate the equation for 
electoral outcome (𝑉𝑖𝑡 ), where the dependent variable (𝑉𝑖𝑡 ) is defined as the state-wise win-
margin of the national level election from the incumbent versus the opponent.  
The vector 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  variable has been used to denote as Gfc, Lfc and Td, each as a separate 
equation, and their respective coefficients in the corresponding equations will be represented by 
𝛤0 and expected to be positive in each case. The vector 𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝐿 is the interaction terms of the 
transfer and the election (year before the election and year of election) variables. These 
interaction terms are expected to positively affect the wining probability of the incumbent. 
Similarly, the vector ∆𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝐿 includes the interaction terms of the transfer in opportunistic 
form and election variables (year before the election and the year of election). The opportunistic 
transfers are expected to yield a positive electoral outcome. The vector 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡  consists of gross 
state domestic product (Gsdp), Inflation (infs) and Density, where their corresponding effect on 
electoral outcome is expected to be positive, negative and dichotomous respectively. Next, the 
vector 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡  consists of voters‟ turnout in percentage (Turn) and the years of experience of 
incumbent party (Nypp) in the office. Historically, the higher turnout was always a questionable 
issue in terms of its effect on electoral outcome. Hansford and Gomez (2010) find that high 
turnout produces less predictable electoral outcome whereas Grofmen, Owen and Collet (1999) 
find that higher turnout rates could be a bad news for the incumbent. Here, we do not have any 
prior. The probability of winning for the experienced incumbent is higher. The vector of 
dummies are 𝑃𝑜𝑙_𝑑𝑢𝑚, which consists of political ideology (Pi_dum), state ruling party being 
the same as the union or an ally of it (Allied), coalition government (Cl_dum) at the union for 
general election and coalition government at the states for the assembly elections, and if there 
exist coalition governments at the centre and state ruling party is an ally of it (Clal_dum).  In 
these three cases we again do not assume any priors. 
The Logit model has been estimated for both the union as well as the assembly elections. 
4.2 Baseline Results 
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Tables a(i) to a(iii) and b(i) to b(iii) in the appendix report the results of the regression for 
general election and assembly elections respectively. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
of victory that takes the value „1‟, if the difference between the number of seats won by 
incumbent and seats won by opponent divided by the total number of parliamentary seats 
(assembly seats in the case of state level elections) in the state is greater than „1‟, and 0 
otherwise. The remaining variables have been used as the independent variables.  Both, in -- 
general and assembly elections -- the transfers variables used as the independent variables are - 
Gfc, Lfc and Td. Table a(i) to a(iii) present the results for the effect of transfer and opportunistic 
transfers along with other economic and political variables that affect the probability to win or 
lose at the state level outcomes of the general elections. Similarly, Table b(i) to b(iii) presents the 
result for the assembly elections.  
Generally, Gfc and Lfc levels on the average, help to win the election, whereas, when interacted 
with the year before and the year of election dummy the effect in general are less likely to win 
the election. However, the opportunistic manipulation in the year before and the year of election 
in Gfc helps in winning the election whereas the same holds only in the case of year of election 
for Lfc
14
. The opportunistic manipulation in the year before to election by the incumbent in case 
of Lfc is strongly punished by the voters. There are pre-electoral cycles in the case of Gfc and 
Lfc, and these also help the incumbent to win the election.
15
 Td has a negative sign and is less 
likely to help in winning the election, may be because of the independent nature of the FC 
control over it. Surprisingly, the year before the election manipulation of Td significantly helps 
the incumbent to win the election; this is denied by the proponents of the view that Td is not 
subject to political manipulations.  
Observing the assembly elections, generally Gfc and Lfc help in winning the elections. However, 
the year before election Gfc and Lfc are less likely to win the election, although the year of 
election levels has a positive effect on the winning probability. In fact, the year before the 
election opportunistic manipulation of these two variables are less likely to win the elections but 
the year of election opportunism has a positive effect on victory possibility. Td at the general 
                                                          
14
 This refers to the opportunistic manipulations of Gfc and Lfc interacted with the year before the election and the 
year of election dummies respectively.  
15
 This is probably because the component of Gfc, which is more open to political manipulations, whereas in the 
case of Lfc, the state has the liability to pay back to the central government and central government does not have 
big problem in allowing for the loans to be transferred. 
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level as well as in its opportunistic behavior in the year of election and the year before the 
election is found to win the assembly elections. This is in stark contrast to the results for the 
general election in our analysis.   
Evidently, the year of election can help the incumbent to regain its power (as confirmed by 
AVV, Drazen and Eslava, 2010, CLP etc.). It appears that being an opportunist with the transfers 
itself are not enough as this behavior is not significantly helping the incumbent to win the 
election. That is, there might be a role for media, actual implementation of the schemes at which 
transfers are being utilized etc. can play the major role. It states that, there are very likely for 
other variables such as the characteristics of the parties and its members might play a role in 
victory in the election as well (i.e. candidate having more education, higher age, wealthier and  
have at least one serious pending criminal case against can garner higher share of votes, Gupta 
and Panagariya, 2014 ).    
4.3 Ideological and other Economic Factors Affecting Victory 
This section analyzes the behavior and impact of the following variables on probability of win of 
the incumbent – Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp), population density (Density), Inflation 
(Infs), Percentage of state-wise voters‟ turnout (Turn), years of experience of the party in the 
power (Nypp), if the incumbent is right wing government (Pi_dum), if the union/state 
government is of coalition type (Cl_dum) and if the union government is a coalition government 
and the state is ruled by the same party as the centre or the allied (Clal_dum). In the case of 
assembly elections, the political ideology (Pi_dum) has been ranked from 1 (right) to 5 (left). So 
if, the coefficient of Pi_dum is positive for general elections and negative for assembly elections, 
the result is coinciding. That is, a right wing government has a higher probability of winning the 
elections. In general, the results show that the vectors of variables like -- 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡  and  
𝑃𝑜𝑙_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡  have similar and robust impact on the possibility of winning the election. In fact, the 
behavior of these variables is not changing within and across the models. The vector 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡  
consists of Gsdp, Infs and Density. A higher Gsdp increases the likelihood of winning the 
election for the incumbent; however, its magnitude is small though highly significant. In India, a 
high inflationary situation has never been a positive signal for the incumbent‟s winning 
possibilities. That is, Infs is highly sensitive to the victory prospects. In fact, for instance, the 
inflation in case of basic food items, such as increased onion prices, indeed brought tears in 
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Delhi assembly election for the incumbent BJP in 1998 when they lost the power to the Congress 
party. For much the same reason, the Congress party hardly managed to retain the power in 2010 
election. A higher population density (Density) is less likely to win the election. The vector 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡  consists of voters‟ turnout (Turn) and number of years of experience (Nypp). Generally, it 
is believed that a higher voter turnout works against the incumbent, but in our case it is helping 
the winning possibility of the incumbent. Similarly, greater experience (Nypp) is more likely to 
win the election. The last set of variables comprise political ideology (Pidum) and coalition 
government at the centre and the state ruling party being allied to it (Clal_dum); these variables 
are contained in vector 𝑃𝑜𝑙_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 . The results show that the chances of the right wing 
incumbent to win the election are higher, and the results are highly significant. If the state and 
centre have the same government or the state government is allied (Allied), then the prospects of 
winning the election are less. The coalition government is less likely to win the elections. 
Similarly, if there exist coalition government at the centre and the same coalition is in power at 
the state or it is allied (Clal_dum) then the incumbent is less likely to win the election.  
In most of cases, the results of the general elections and assembly elections are similar. A few 
results tend to differ, that is, the presence of conditional fixed effect in general elections and 
random effect in assembly elections. The additional dis-similarities are: Density is more likely to 
win the assembly election but not the general elections results of the state-wise; if there is a 
coalition government at the union and the state ruling party is an ally, then the winning 
probability is higher in the general election whereas there is less likelihood of winning the 
assembly election.  
5. Conclusion  
The sub-national transfer of different kind, such as Gfc, Lfc and Td, involve three important 
institutions in the biggest democracy of the world, namely - Planning Commission (Now NITI 
Aayog)), Finance Commission and the incumbent government. Although, the FC is an 
independent constitutional entity, constituted every five years by President, yet there is the scope 
for the central government under clause 3(c) of article 280 which reads, “any other matter 
referred to the commission by the president in the interest of sound finance”, to put certain 
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restrictions on Finance Commission.
16
 The most of the components of grants from the centre 
(Gfc) and the Td are under the purview of FC. However, the Planning Commission and central 
government play a greater role in the Gfc and Lfc.  
To trace the political transfer cycles, we find that, Gfc and Lfc are politically motivated and 
exhibit pre-electoral cycles, whereas no clear cycles have been traced in the case of Td. This 
finding is similar to the literature on political budget cycle (PBC)
17
. The PTC trace the cycle in 
the year before the election for the general elections but it is the year of election for the assembly 
elections. Also, in almost all the cases the transfer variables are autoregressive up to two lags but 
mostly significant only up to first lag. A right wing and coalition incumbents have a tendency to 
transfer less to the states, however, the former provide more loans to the states. Additionally, if 
there exists the same party rule at the state level or if the state is an ally of the centre then the 
allied state receives more rewards from the centre in the form of Gfc and Lfc.  
In the second part of the paper, we analyze whether such politically motivated transfers actually 
impact the probability of winning the election. Using the Logit estimation method, we find that 
Gfc and Lfc in the year before the election punish the incumbent, whereas an opportunistic 
manipulation in the year of election rewards the incumbent by positively affecting the probability 
of winning the election. That is, even if there is a pre-electoral cycle in Gfc and Lfc, the 
incumbent is less likely to win the election. In fact, in the case of pre-electoral cycle in Lfc, the 
incumbent is strongly punished by the voters. This may be ascribed to the associated loan 
liability to be paid back by the states to the centre. The remaining economic, political and 
political dummies are robust in its results. That is, a higher Gsdp help the central incumbent 
government to win the election, though the increase is very less in magnitude. Inflation (Infs) is 
very harmful for the incumbent as it increases the likelihood of losing the election. However, a 
higher voters‟ turnout (Turnout) in the state is more likely to help in winning the election to 
incumbent and a more experienced government (Nypp) has a higher probability of winning the 
election. Similarly, a right wing (Pidum) government is more likely to win the election, whereas 
the presence of a coalition government where states are its allies reduces the possibility of 
winning the election. 
                                                          
16
 Finance Commission is an independent constitutional body, constituted every five year by president under article-
280(iii).  
17
 This is analyzed in another paper by the authors. 
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The likely questions that emerge from this paper that can lead to further research are as follows: 
how do these transfers‟ cycles behave when the allied parties of the coalition work operate as a 
special interest group? How will the results be affected if the model involves an industry special 
interest group, to which the union government provides the regulatory benefit and, in return, 
receives bribes to fund the election campaign expenditure? The third extension from this paper 
could analyze the effect of decentralization on economic growth.    
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variables and Data Definitions 
Variables Data Sources Definitions and Details 
Grants from the 
Centre (Gfc) 
1980-2010 
, Reserve Bank of 
India  
(Handbook of 
Statistics on State 
Government 
Finances) 
Grants given to states are one of the channels to transfer the 
fund processed through the Planning Commission. This is 
being given for state and central plan schemes, centrally 
sponsored schemes, North Eastern Councils/Special plan 
schemes and non-plan grants (Statutory Grants, Grants for 
Natural Calamities, non plan non-statutory grants). The basic 
principles for Grants are – determining the need of states from 
its budget, observing the efforts made by states to realize their 
potential revenue and equalizing standards of basic services 
across states. Grants could be given to take care of any special 
burden or obligations of national concern within the States‟ 
sphere, as well for providing any beneficial service of national 
interest to less advanced States. The earlier finance 
commissions have predominantly adopted a gap-filling 
approach to determine the quantum of grants to states to cover 
the deficit in the non-plan revenue account. Effectively there 
are five purposes for which Gfc can be provided – revenue 
deficit, disaster relief, to supplement the resources to the local 
bodies, sector specific and states specific. 
Loan from the 
Centre (Lfc) 
1980-2010 
, Reserve Bank of 
India  
(Handbook of 
Statistics on State 
Government 
Finances) 
Loan is also processed through the Planning commission. 
However, in this case states are liable to pay back the loan. It 
can be plan loan or non plan loan from the centre. 
Gross Devolution 
and Transfer of 
Resources from 
Centre (Gdtr) 
1980-2010 
, Reserve Bank of 
India  
(Handbook of 
Statistics on State 
Government 
Finances) 
Devolution and other transfer of resources are done through 
the Finance Commission. It is also the shared taxes of the 
Union from the states. 
 
 
(I) Transfer Cycles using General Elections 
Figure a(i): Grants from the Centre (Gfc) 
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Figure a(ii): Loan from the Centre (Lfc) 
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Figure a(iii): Tax Devolution (Td) 
 
(II) Transfer Cycles using Assembly Election  
Figure b (i) Grants from the Centre (Gfc) 
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Figure b (ii) Loan from the Centre (Lfc) 
Figure b (iii) Tax Devolution (Td) 
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(III) Logit Model using General Elections 
Table a(i): Effect of Grants from the Centre on winning possibility of the incumbent 
Dependent Var.: Victory  1 2 3 4 5 
Grants from the Centre 
0.044 
[0.048] 
- 
 
- - 
Grants from the Centre  
(Year Before to the Election) 
- -0.014 
[0.024]  
- - 
Grants from the Centre  
(Year of Election) 
- - -0.011 
[0.026] 
- 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Grants 
from the Centre (Year before to 
Election) 
- - - 0.207 
[0.109]* 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Grants 
from the Centre (Year of Election) 
- - 
- 
- 
0.045 
[0.084] 
Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp) 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
Inflation (Infs) 
-0.083 
[0.030]*** 
-0.080 
[0.030]*** 
-0.080 
[0.030]*** 
-0.075 
[0.030]** 
-0.081 
[0.030]*** 
Density  
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.00 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
Voter Turnout (Turnout in %) 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.187 
[0.031]*** 
0.186 
[0.031]*** 
No. of Years Party is in Power (Nypp) 
0.029 
[0.014]** 
0.028 
[0.014]** 
0.029 
[0.014]** 
0.032 
[0.014]** 
0.028 
[0.014]** 
Ideology (Pidum) 
1.505 
[0.565]*** 
1.349 
[0.553]** 
1.365 
[0.551]** 
1.598 
[0.563]*** 
1.333 
[0.557]** 
Same Ruling party at the state or allied 
(Allied) 
-1.321 
[0.503]*** 
-1.311 
[0.499]*** 
1.304 
[0.499]*** 
1.292 
[0.500]*** 
-1.292 
[0.499]** 
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Coalition Government at the Centre 
level  (Cldum) 
-0.893 
[0.505]* 
-0.923 
[0.504]* 
-0.897 
[0.504]* 
-0.811 
[0.506]* 
-0.877 
[0.508]* 
Coalition Government at the Centre and 
same party is in Power at state level or 
ally (Clal_dum) 
0.321 
[0.629] 
0.326 
[0.627] 
0.318 
[0.626] 
0.280 
[0.629] 
0.299 
[0.628] 
LR  χ2(8) 109.06 
[Pr.=0.00] 
108.56 
[Pr.=0.00] 
108.41 
[Pr.=0.00] 
112.04 
[Pr.=0.00] 
108.51 
[Pr.=0.00] 
Hausman Test 
χ2=23.81 
[Pr.=0.005] 
χ2=27.61 
[Prob=0.001] 
χ2=31.89 
[Pr.=0.000] 
χ2=20.73 
[Pr.=0.014] 
χ2=14.19 
[Pr.=0.116] 
No. of Obs. 416 
416 
416 416 416 
Note- Coefficients from conditional fixed effect Logit regressions. Robust Standard errors are in bracket.  ***, **, * 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table a(ii): Effect of Loan from the Centre on winning possibility of the incumbent. 
Dependent Var.: Victory   1 2 3 4 5 
Loan from the Centre (Lfc) 
0.063 
[0.031]** 
- 
- - - 
Lfc (Year Before to the Election) - 
-0.017 
[0.018] 
- 
- - 
Lfc (Year of Election) - - 
0.0003 
[0.021] 
- 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Lfc 
 (Year before to Election) 
- - - -0.083 
[0.053]  
Opportunistic Manipulation of Lfc 
 (Year of Election) 
- - 
- 
- -0.081 
[0.055] 
Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp) 
0.000 
[0.000]*** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
Inflation (Infs) 
-0.087 
[0.031]**** 
-0.081 
[0.030]*** 
-0.081 
[0.030]*** 
-0.082 
[0.030]*** 
-0.077 
[0.030]*** 
Density  -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
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[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Voter Turnout (Turnout in %) 
0.175 
[0.030]*** 
0.187 
[0.031]*** 
0.184 
[0.031]*** 
0.187 
[0.031]*** 
0.188 
[0.031]*** 
No. of Years Party is in Power (Nypp) 
0.032 
[0.014]** 
0.029 
[0.014]** 
0.029 
[0.014]** 
0.032 
[0.014]** 
0.031 
[0.014]** 
Ideology (Pidum) 
1.480 
[0.555]*** 
1.380 
[0.550]** 
1.387 
[0.551]** 
1.550 
[0.563]*** 
1.467 
[0.555]*** 
Same Ruling party at the state or allied 
(Allied) 
-1.268 
[0.511]** 
-1.341 
[0.502]*** 
-1.298 
[0.499]*** 
-1.365 
[0.505]*** 
-1.296 
[0.500]*** 
Coalition Government at the Centre 
level  (Cldum) 
-0.920 
[0.511]* 
-0.918 
[0.504]* 
-0.913 
[0.506]* 
-0.946 
[0.505]* 
-0.926 
[0.503]* 
Coalition Government at the Centre and 
same party is in Power at state level or 
ally(Clal_dm) 
0.294 
[0.640] 
0.345 
[0.628] 
0.316 
[0.627] 
0.390 
[0.631] 
0.313 
[0.628] 
LR  χ2(.) 
112.54 
[Pr.=0.00] 
109.07 
[Pr.=0.00] 
104.9 
[Pr.=0.00] 
110.65 
[Pr.=0.00] 
110.63 
[Pr.=0.00] 
Hausman Test 
χ2=4.11 
[Pr.=0.9044] 
χ2=16.95 
[Pr.=0.0495] 
χ2=20.33 
[Pr.=0.016] 
χ2=124.28 
[Pr.=0.000] 
χ2=22.90 
[Pr.=0.006] 
No. of Obs. 416 416 416 416 416 
Note- Coefficients from conditional fixed effect Logit regressions. Robust Standard errors are in bracket.  ***, **, * 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table a(iii): Effect of Tax Devolution on winning possibility of the incumbent 
Dependent Var.: Victory   1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Devolution (Td) 
-0.072 
[0.042]* 
 
- - - 
Td (Year Before to the Election) 
- 
-0.012 
[0.014] 
 
- - 
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Td (Year of Election) 
- - 
-0.013 
[0.014]  
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Td 
 (Year before to Election) 
- - - 0.223 
[0.103]** 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Td 
(Year of Election) 
- 
- - - 
-0.078 
[0.058] 
Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp) 
0.000 
[0.000]* 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
Inflation (Infs) 
-0.083 
[0.030]*** 
-0.080 
[0.030]*** 
-0.081 
[0.030]*** 
-0.076 
[0.030]*** 
-0.082 
[0.030]*** 
Density  
-0.001 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
Voter Turnout (Turnout in %) 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.185 
[0.031]*** 
0.186 
[0.031]*** 
No. of Years Party is in Power (Nypp) 
0.029 
[0.014]** 
0.029 
[0.014]** 
0.028 
[0.014]** 
0.025 
[0.014]* 
0.028 
[0.014]** 
Ideology (Pidum) 
1.159 
[0.566]** 
1.376 
[0.550]** 
1.335 
[0.552]** 
1.374 
[0.551]** 
1.303 
[0.555]** 
Same Ruling party at the state or allied 
(Allied) 
-1.522 
[0.524]*** 
-1.323 
[0.500]*** 
-1.319 
[0.500]*** 
-1.306 
[0.501]*** 
-1.305 
[0.501]*** 
Coalition Government at the Centre 
level  (Cldum) 
-1.113 
[0.522]** 
-0.918 
[0.504]* 
-0.889 
[0.505]* 
-1.082 
[0.512]** 
-0.893 
[0.504]* 
Coalition Government at the Centre and 
same party is in Power at state level or 
ally (Clal_dm) 
0.484 
[0.643] 
0.329 
[0.628] 
0.330 
[0.627] 
0.356 
[0.633] 
0.327 
[0.629] 
LR  χ2 
111.25 
[Pr.=0.00] 
108.88 
[Pr.=0.00] 
108.99 
[Pr.=0.00] 
114.04 
[Pr.=0.00] 
109.09 
[Pr.=0.00] 
Hausman Test 
χ2=17.66 
[Pr.=0.039] 
χ2=16.73 
[Pr.=0.053] 
χ2=30.93 
[Pr.=0.0003] 
χ2=19.27 
[Pr.=0.023] 
χ2=55.57 
[Pr.=0.000] 
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No. of Obs. 416 416 416 416 416 
Note- Coefficients from conditional fixed Logit regressions. Robust Standard errors are in bracket.  ***, **, * 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
(IV) Logit Model using Assembly Elections 
Table b(i): Effect of Grants from the Centre on winning possibility of the incumbent 
Dependent Var.: Victory 1 2 3 4 5 
Grants from the Centre 
0.071 
[0.042]* 
- 
- 
- - 
Grants from the Centre 
(Year Before to the Election) 
- 
-0.002 
[0.024] 
- 
- - 
Grants from the Centre 
(Year of Election) 
- - 
0.024 
[0.025] 
- - 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Grants 
from the Centre (Year before to 
Election) 
- - - 
-0.174 
[0.109] 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Grants 
from the Centre (Year of Election) 
- - - - 
0.114 
[0.101] 
Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp) 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
Inflation (Infs) 
-0.043 
[0.025]* 
-0.038 
[0.025] 
-0.042 
[0.025]* 
-0.039 
[0.025] 
-0.037 
[0.025] 
Density 
0.003 
[0.002]** 
0.003 
[0.002]** 
0.003 
[0.002]** 
0.004 
[0.002]** 
0.003 
[0.002]** 
Voter Turnout (Turnout in %) 
0.103 
[0.026]*** 
0.095 
[0.025]*** 
0.096 
[0.025]*** 
0.101 
[0.026]*** 
0.097 
[0.025]*** 
No. of Years Party is in Power (Nypp) -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
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[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
Ideology (Pidum) 
-0.167 
[0.182] 
-0.233 
[0.179] 
-0.228 
[0.178] 
-0.250 
[0.179] 
-0.219 
[0.179] 
Same Ruling party at the state or allied 
(Allied) 
1.390 
[0.431]*** 
1.491 
[0.427]*** 
1.499 
[0.426]*** 
1.569 
[0.429]*** 
1.472 
[0.427]*** 
Coalition Government at state level  
(Cldum) 
-0.300 
[0.318] 
-0.255 
[0.315] 
-0.259 
[0.316] 
-0.254 
[0.317] 
-0.259 
[0.316] 
Coalition Government at the Centre and 
same party is in Power at state level or 
ally (Clal_dm) 
-1.710 
[0.501]*** 
-1.798 
[0.500]*** 
-1.817 
[0.500]*** 
-1.862 
[0.505]*** 
-1.781 
[0.500]*** 
Constant 
-8.428 
[2.131]*** 
-7.235 
[1.996]*** 
-7.356 
[1.990]*** 
-7.698 
[2.046]*** 
-7.449 
[2.008]*** 
Wald - χ2(9) 28.09 
[Pr.=0.0017] 
25.91 
[Pr.=0.004] 
26.82 
[Pr.=0.051] 
27.67 
[Pr.=0.002] 
27.05 
[Pr.=0.003] 
Hausman Test 
χ2=1.41 
[Pr.=0.997] 
χ2=5.88 
[Prob=0.00] 
χ2=1.09 
[Pr.=0.999] 
χ2=0.79 
[Pr.=0.999] 
χ2=1.48 
[Pr.=0.997] 
No. of Obs. 434 
433 
434 433 434 
Note-Coefficients from random effect Logit regressions. Robust Standard errors are in bracket.  ***, **, * 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table b(ii): Effect of Loan from the Centre on winning possibility of the incumbent. 
Dependent Var.: Victory   1 2 3 4 5 
Loan from the Centre (Lfc) 
0.104 
[0.028]*** 
- 
- - - 
Lfc (Year Before to the Election) - 
-0.005 
[0.018] 
- 
- - 
Lfc (Year of Election) - - 
0.023 
[0.023] 
- 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Lfc 
 (Year before to Election) 
- - - -0.149 
[0.090]  
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Opportunistic Manipulation of Lfc 
 (Year of Election) 
- - 
- 
- 0.231 
[0.079]*** 
Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp) 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
Inflation (Infs) 
-0.047 
[0.027]* 
-0.084 
[0.029] 
-0.042 
[0.025]* 
-0.039 
[0.025] 
-0.043 
[0.026]* 
Density  
0.006 
[0.002]** 
0.003 
[0.002]** 
0.004 
[0.002]** 
0.003 
[0.002]** 
0.004 
[0.002]** 
Voter Turnout (Turnout in %) 
0.099 
[0.027]*** 
0.094 
[0.025]*** 
0.094 
[0.025]*** 
0.096 
[0.025]*** 
0.097 
[0.026]*** 
No. of Years Party is in Power (Nypp) 
0.005 
[0.013] 
0.000 
[0.012] 
0.001 
[0.012] 
0.000 
[0.012] 
0.001 
[0.012] 
Ideology (Pidum) 
-0.281 
[0.183] 
-0.235 
[0.178] 
-0.240 
[0.178] 
-0.259 
[0.182] 
-0.220 
[0.181] 
Same Ruling party at the state or allied 
(Allied) 
1.397 
[0.451]*** 
1.482 
[0.428]** 
1.500 
[0.427]*** 
1.520 
[0.429]*** 
1.472 
[0.433]*** 
Coalition Government at state level  
(Cldum) 
-0.204 
[0.328] 
-0.254 
[0.315] 
-0.258 
[0.315] 
-0.226 
[0.316] 
-0.229 
[0.319] 
Coalition Government at the Centre and 
same party is in Power at state level or 
ally (Clal_dm) 
-1.685 
[0.525]*** 
-1.791 
[0.501]*** 
-1.809 
[0.501]*** 
-1.822 
[0.502]*** 
-1.859 
[0.509]*** 
Constant 
-9.635 
[2.443]*** 
-7.185 
[2.002]*** 
-7.340 
[1.995]*** 
-7.283 
[2.006]*** 
-7.548 
[2.053]*** 
Wald  χ2(.) 
35.14 
[Pr.=0.0001] 
25.97 
[Pr.=0.004] 
26.84 
[Pr.=0.00] 
28.00 
[Pr.=0.002] 
32.26 
[Pr.=0.0004
] 
Hausman Test 
χ2=7.15 
[Pr.=0.622] 
χ2=10.51 
[Pr.=0.311] 
χ2=4.46 
[Pr.=0.878] 
χ2=2.57 
[Pr.=0.979] 
χ2=1.38 
[Pr.=0.998] 
No. of Obs. 434 433 434 433 434 
Note- Coefficients from random effect Logit regressions. Robust Standard errors are in bracket.  ***, **, * 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Column 3 and 5 has hausman test of suest type. 
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Table b (iii): Effect of Tax Devolution on winning possibility of the incumbent 
Dependent Var.: Victory   1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Devolution (Td) 
0.012 
[0.005]*** 
 
- - - 
Td (Year Before to the Election) 
- 
0.001 
[0.003] 
 
- - 
Td (Year of Election) 
- - 
0.002 
[0.003]  
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Td 
 (Year before to Election) 
- - - 0.020 
[0.016] 
- 
Opportunistic Manipulation of Td 
(Year of Election) 
- 
- - - 
0.009 
[0.019] 
Gross State Domestic Product (Gsdp) 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
Inflation (Infs) 
-0.009 
[0.004]** 
-0.008 
[0.005]* 
-0.009 
[0.005]** 
-0.010 
[0.029]** 
-0.010 
[0.005]* 
Density  
-0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.000 
[0.000]** 
0.001 
[0.000]** 
Voter Turnout (Turnout in %) 
0.011 
[0.003]*** 
0.010 
[0.003]*** 
0.010 
[0.003]*** 
0.007 
[0.003]*** 
0.011 
[0.003]*** 
No. of Years Party is in Power (Nypp) 
0.000 
[0.002] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.000 
[0.002] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.000 
[0.002] 
Ideology (Pidum) 
-0.032 
[0.031] 
-0.038 
[0.032] 
-0.039 
[0.032] 
-0.022 
[0.031] 
-0.042 
[0.032] 
Same Ruling party at the state or allied 
(Allied) 
0.225 
[0.072]*** 
0.232 
[0.073]*** 
0.230 
[0.072]*** 
0.234 
[0.074]*** 
0.229 
[0.072]*** 
48 
 
Coalition Government at state level  
(Cldum) 
-0.057 
[0.057] 
-0.065 
[0.057] 
-0.065 
[0.057] 
-0.056 
[0.058] 
-0.065 
[0.057] 
Coalition Government at the Centre and 
same party is in Power at state level or 
ally (Clal_dm) 
-0.235 
[0.079]*** 
-0.258 
[0.079]*** 
-0.258 
[0.079]*** 
-0.257 
[0.081]*** 
-0.258 
[0.079]*** 
Constant 
-0.471 
[0.233] 
-0.295 
[0.230] 
-0.302 
[0.230] 
-0.103 
[0.196] 
-0.352 
[0.248] 
Wald  χ2(.) 
34.56 
[Pr.=0.0001] 
27.95 
[Pr.=0.002] 
28.66 
[Pr.=0.0014] 
26.17 
[Pr.=0.004] 
29.53 
[Pr.=0.001] 
Hausman Test 
χ2=2.72 
[Pr.=0.974] 
χ2=2.97 
[Pr.=0.965] 
χ2=1.53 
[Pr.=0.997] 
χ2=5.67 
[Pr.=0.772] 
χ2=1.69 
[Pr.=0.995] 
No. of Obs. 434 433 434 433 434 
Note- Coefficients from random effect Logit regressions. Robust Standard errors are in bracket.  ***, **, * 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
